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CHRISTOPHER TATUM:

ABSTRACT
Human Rights and United States Foreign Policy: Morality
vs. Self-Interest

(Under the direction of Professor John Winkle)
This thesis has set out to explore the role that human rights considerations play in
United States foreign policy, if any.

Has this role changed over time, as new

circumstances arise, or has it been consistent throughout the twentieth (and twenty-first,
to this point) century?

What are the inherent tensions in policy formation that compete

when discussing human rights? In answering this question, three main areas of influence
on foreign policy were consulted:
economic factors.

domestic political factors, geopolitical factors, and

In researching this thesis, I have consulted several different kinds of

sources, including scholarly articles, books, primary documents in the form of public
opinion polls, transcripts of hearings, official government reports, independent agency
reports, and actual treaties and international agreements.

In addition, I interviewed a

former United States ambassador to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
In general, I found that there were indeed inherent tensions competing for control

of U.S. foreign policy in the area of human rights, and that, throughout varying
administrations and majority parties in American government, the side of self-interest has

generally dominated American policy. Examining the final outcomes of these policy
actions has led to the conclusion that perhaps what America thinks is in its self-interest in
the short run may not always be the best course of action, and perhaps there is a place for
morals in foreign policy.
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Chapter I: Introduction
The United States has always seen itself as a “city upon a hill” that serves to show
the rest of the world true liberty. Throughout the history of the United States, and
especially since the end of World War II, there has been a sense that America is the best
example of freedom, equality, and opportunity and that Americans have at least some
responsibility for spreading these values to the rest of the world.

This self-image has a

great effect on all policy debates, and foreign policy is no exception.

The prevailing

American opinion sees the U.S. as “a global beacon and shining example for personal
freedom, regardless of evident blemishes on its national record concerning slavery, racial

and gender discrimination, and various forms of other bigotry” (Forsythe, 3). In spite of
these “blemishes,” there is certainly no doubt that the United States has been a constant
example and promoter of liberal democratic ideals and rights.

Of course, one of the most

fundamental ideals of the liberal democratic state is a guarantee of basic human rights.
But has there ever been an agreement on what these rights are or how they are defined?
Most importantly, has the United States ever accepted them?
There are two basic kinds of human rights — the first group includes “negative
rights,” including basic civil and political liberties (freedom of speech, assembly,
religion, freedom from discrimination, etc.), called this because they involve actions the

state cannot take against people (Snow, 331).

The second group encompasses “positive

rights,” which are basic economic rights such as the right to enough food and education;
basically “minimum quality of life standards” (Snow, 331).

These basic forms of human

rights have been recognized in many international treaties in the United Nations, and the
United States has ratified several of them; however, the U.S. is generally only willing to
support the negative human rights and ignores the positive. For example, the 1948
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, the 1975 Convention Against Torture, the 1948 Genocide Convention,

and the 1965 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination have
all been signed and ratified by the Senate.' All these treaties are recognitions of basic
civil and political liberties, with the exception of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, which is only intended to serve as a guideline and has no real enforcement
clauses.

Even when recognizing these rights, the United States has been extremely
lethargic; the 1948 Genocide Convention was not ratified until 1986, and the 1966

Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which simply includes broad statements of
support or condemnation with no obligation to act, was finally confirmed by the Senate in
1992 (Forsythe, 28). Both of these ratifications were accompanied by Senatorial
reservations or restrictive declarations that attempted to allow the United States to accept
the treaties without incurring any real legal responsibilities.

This was evident to the point

that the Dutch government accused the Americans of violating international law by
making reservations that were “incompatible with the basic purposes of the treaties in
question” (Forsythe, 28).

In fact, objections to one U.S. reservation to the Genocide

Convention were filed by Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Mexico,

' Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights report: Status of Ratifications of the
Principal International Human Rights Treaties
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Norway, Spain, Sweden, and Great Britain in addition to the Dutch complaint.”

While

the U.S. recognizes certain negative rights, even then it is extremely reluctant to commit
to any action in support of those rights.
Whereas the United States has been slow to recognize negative rights in
international treaties, it has actually refused to recognize basic positive human rights
through treaty law.

The U.N. Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights has

never been ratified, although it was endorsed by both Presidents Carter and Clinton
(Forsythe, 29).

Why is the United States so unwilling to commit to human rights

treaties? There are two main philosophical and political objections to signing these
treaties:

dilution of sovereignty and the fact that a commitment to promoting equality in

treaties means reexamining domestic policy as well in the form of welfare, healthcare,

and other areas (Snow, 338).

Since the positive rights enumerated in this treaty have not

been officially recognized by the United States, it technically has no obligation to protect
them, either at home or abroad. But what about the reservations to the Genocide
Convention and the fact that the United States has yet to ratify or even sign many
Optional Protocols to several treaties to which it is a signatory?

If America is such a

supporter of human rights, why sign the treaties and not the additional protocols?
The answers to these questions actually lie within the treaties and protocols
themselves.

First of all, as has already been mentioned, the American government simply

fears incurring any actual obligations to act under the law in foreign countries. For
example, the reservation to the Genocide Convention that was so heavily protested in the
international community deals with American doubts about Article V of the Convention,
which specifies that each state party to the Convention must enact legislation to give

Lo

° http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/treaty
| gen.htm

effect to its provisions.? Another reason behind the American hesitation to sign is the
fear of frivolous investigations by international bodies that might infringe on U.S.
sovereignty.

The Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political

Rights that the U.S. has refused to sign is one giving individuals the right to complain to
the U.N. Human Rights Committee if they feel their rights have been violated.* In
addition, the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination

Against Women (the actual convention has been signed, but not ratified by the U.S.)

gives the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women authority to
receive communications from groups or individuals who claim they have been
discriminated against and to investigate these claims.’

If there were no limitations on

who could file these complaints and when to ensure that the processes are not abused for
political or personal reasons, these concerns about sovereignty would seem to be
legitimate.
This is not the case, however.

Within each of these protocols there are guarantees

that there will be no investigations into frivolous complaints and that the United Nations
will not get involved until, as the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination
of Discrimination Against Women puts it, “all available domestic remedies have been
exhausted” (Art. IV). There is a similar guarantee in the Optional Protocol to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights that the U.S. has refused to sign (Art.

II). This protocol even goes so far as to ensure that there can be no anonymous
complaints and that State Parties who have had complaints filed against them must be

* Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
* Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1976.
* Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
1999.

notified (Art. III and IV). Simply put, the United States does not trust any international
body to enforce its own treaty law and guard against abuses; therefore, since effectively
written international laws are not supported by the United States, the most powerful and
wealthy nation in the world, they cannot be effective. It is somewhat of a catch-22:

If

the U.N. drafts treaties that would be enforceable as international law, the U.S. will not
sign them, rendering them useless; however, if the U.N. drafts toothless treaties that

cannot be enforced, the U.S. will sign them and then complain of the ineffectiveness and
inefficiency of the United Nations and international law in general.
This paradox highlights what has been the basic conflict in American foreign
policy since the end of World War II: there has been a constant struggle between
proponents of national interest in the historical perspective on the one hand and those
guided by morality and ideology on the other, or in the words of Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.,
between “an addiction to experiment and a susceptibility to ideology” (1).

Since the time

of the first settlers, some have seen America as a “redeemer nation,” and this idea has

periodically manifested itself throughout the history of the United States, especially in the
twentieth century in Woodrow Wilson’s efforts to create a peaceful world order and in
John Foster Dulles’ crusade against “godless communism” (Schlesinger, 2). However,

the Founding Fathers did not seem to share this ideological tendency, believing that states
should only respond to particular national interests (Schlesinger, 2). This seemed to

dictate a policy of leadership by example, not intervention (Schlesinger, 3). All of this
has led to a competition in American policymaking between “realism and ideology,” and
although the ideologies in question might change, the basic conflicts do not.
“So two strains have competed for the control of American foreign policy: one
empirical, the other dogmatic; one viewing the world in the perspective of history,

the other in the perspective of ideology; one supposing that the United States is
not entirely immune to the imperfections, weaknesses and evils incident to all
societies, the other regarding the United States as indeed the happy empire of
perfect wisdom and perfect virtue, commissioned to save all mankind”
(Schlesinger, 4).
Schlesinger clearly comes down on the side of realism in this debate, saying that “the
error of ideology is to prefer essence to existence” and that “its besetting sin is to
substitute models for reality” (6). His opinion seems to have been that of the majority
U.S. policymakers throughout the twentieth century, although he did argue that the
crusade against communism was much too ideological. However, the realist argument
has certainly held sway when it comes to the question of whether or not to intervene on
behalf of the oppressed peoples of the world. This has been the essential conflict
between America’s self-image of a beacon of freedom and its practices of nonintervention, even in cases of genocide.

In the end, it would seem that national interests

always trump international security and human rights, but what role have U.S. national
interests actually played in this process?
From the beginning of the twentieth century, the United States was hesitant to get
involved in foreign conflicts. Even in World War I and II, the U.S. was hesitant to
defend its democratic partners until its own commercial and military interests were
attacked (Forsythe, 23). Obviously, the one factor that dictated U.S. foreign policy for
the majority of the second half of the twentieth century was the Cold War.

This

ideological struggle was seen as probably the most important fight in America’s short
history, perhaps even more important than World War II. Cold War politics demanded
strategic alliances with sometimes unsavory regimes.

“During the Cold War the U.S.

undermined a number of elected governments and engaged in other anti-humanitarian

interventions in order to increase its power vis-a-vis the Soviet Union” (Forsythe, 23).

It

is debatable whether or not this policy of supporting ruthless dictators actually worked;

“the United States has always had far less leverage with the various dictators it has
supported than American leaders believed” (Schmitz, 309). This was obvious in various
instances, such as the case of Saddam Hussein; however, the Cold War was a special

circumstance.

In many of those cases, supporting one authoritarian regime against a

different, Soviet-backed authoritarian regime may have actually been best for not only
U.S. national security, but also international security and the human rights of citizens
within those nations. But what about after the Cold War?

Once the Soviet menace was

out of the picture, wouldn’t the United States stop supporting undemocratic regimes and
intervene on behalf of human rights, truly serving as that “global beacon?”
This certainly seemed to be the intention of at least one U.S. president, even
before the official end of the Cold War. During Jimmy Carter’s 1977 commencement
speech at the University of Notre Dame, he made several statements concerning the
decline of the Soviet Union and its effect on U.S. foreign policy. “Being confident in our
own future, we are now free of that inordinate fear of communism which once led us to

embrace any dictator who joined us in that fear” (Schmitz, 301). Carter went on to
outline his goals for American policy, saying, “I believe we can have a foreign policy that
is democratic, that is based on fundamental values, and that uses power and

influence...for humane purposes” (Schmitz, 300). Would this policy shift actually
happen, either during Carter’s presidency or in the future? In the short run, it certainly
seemed that the answer was no. In spite of being recognized both during and since his
presidency as a leading advocate for human rights all over the world, the Carter

administration continued to support dictators like the Shah in Iran and Somoza in
Nicaragua against revolutionary forces (Schmitz, 302). President Carter never got the

chance to expand his human rights agenda as president beyond one term, and it seemed
the change in policy of which he spoke would have to wait, at least until the Cold War
officially ended.
The last years of the Cold War and its immediate aftermath brought some hope
that human rights policy would change.

In 1988, the Senate finally passed an

implementation act enforcing the Genocide Convention, making genocide a punishable
crime in the United States (Power, 168). After this act and the ratification of the
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights a few years later in 1992, it seemed as though the
United States might be willing to get behind international law and act to help oppressed
people around the world. Would this actually be the case? Two major examples in the
years immediately following these actions would signal the direction of future U.S.
human rights foreign policy.
Bosnia
After the breakup of Yugoslavia, it was not difficult to predict that there would be
problems in the Balkans that might lead to war. A seven-month war between Serbia and
Croatia left 10,000 people dead and several hundred thousand without homes (Power,
247). Bosnia, as an ethnically and religiously diverse nation (43 percent Muslim, 35
percent Orthodox Serb, and 18 percent Roman Catholic Croat), was an obvious future
trouble spot, and in 1992, when 99 percent of the people of Bosnia voted to become
independent in a referendum mostly boycotted by Serbs, it was clear that Serbian
President Slobodan Milosevic would not let Bosnia go without a fight (Power, 248).

Even as the United States and the European Commission granted diplomatic recognition
to an independent Bosnia, some 80,000 Yugoslav National Army troops joined local Serb
forces to round up non-Serbs in Bosnia (Power, 249). Over the next three and a half
years, “the United States, Europe, and the United Nations stood by while some 200,000
Bosnians were killed, [and] more than two million were displaced” (Power, 251).
Obviously, genocide had occurred and the United States, along with the rest of the world,

had done nothing to stop it. The question then becomes, what did the American
government know?

Was it possible that the genocide had been carried out so secretly, or

so quickly, that the U.S. and the rest of the world simply did not have time or knowledge
to react?
In fact, the United States government had received advance warning from inside

sources.

In August 1990, Senator Bob Dole visited Kosovo and warned the U.S.

Congress on the floor of the Senate that the Serbs were already oppressing Albanians
there, and the scene was “appalling and unforgettable” (Power, 254).

In Dole’s words,

“The United States cannot sit this out on the sidelines, we have a moral obligation to take

a strong stand in defense of the individual rights of Albanians and all the people of

Yugoslavia.”®

Later, in August 1992, only four months into the war in Bosnia, Helsinki

Watch, the European arm of Human Rights Watch, declared that there was at least “prima
facie evidence that genocide is taking place” (Power, 257).
extremely well-publicized.

In fact, the conflict was

“No other atrocity campaign in the twentieth century was

better monitored and understood by the U.S. government” (Power, 264).

Since the

American government could not plead ignorance, and it had finally ratified the Genocide

° Bob Dole, “Yugoslavia,” Congressional Record, 101° Cong., 2

sess., 1990, 136, pt. 117:S13488.

Convention recognizing the crime, it had to come up with another way to stay out of
Bosnia and avoid helping the Muslims there.

Bosnia revealed the first use of a new strategy in U.S. foreign policy to avoid
involvement in foreign conflicts. After recognizing Bosnia as an independent country
and hearing from members of its own Congress that Serb troops in army vehicles marked
“JNA (Yugoslav National Army)” were occupying parts of the nation, the United States
still called the conflict a civil war so that it could remain uninvolved (Power, 261).

Although the U.S. knew about Serb concentration camps as early as May 1992, and by
late in that year 80 percent of the American public favored the U.S. contributing its share
of peacekeepers, the Bush administration still refused requests for troops and, most
importantly, refused to acknowledge that genocide was taking place (Power, 282).
was to be the dominant new strategy of the United States government:

This

deny, deny, deny.

If the U.S. government refused to recognize atrocities as genocide, then it was not
technically obligated to do anything about them.
Even with the advent of a new administration under Bill Clinton, the strategy
remained the same.

The Clinton administration still refused to acknowledge genocide as

late as March 1993 (Power, 298). Finally, when the U.N. Security Council agreed to
create “safe areas” in Muslim-held zones, the mission failed largely because of the
American refusal to commit troops (Power, 303). The Bosnian tragedy served as an early
indicator that U.S. policy would not change, and that genocide and other human rights
atrocities would still be tolerated. The United States would simply look the other way, or
use semantics to avoid involvement; however, maybe it was just that the Bosnian
genocide was not obvious enough.

After all, it was during a war, and although 200,000
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people over three and a half years is tragic, it does not compare to past genocides like
Cambodia or the Holocaust.

Perhaps, if things got bad enough somewhere else, the U.S.

really would change its policy and intervene to help those innocent civilians being killed
simply because of their ethnicity; then again, perhaps not.
Rwanda
In terms of sheer numbers and efficiency of killing, the Rwandan genocide is
unparalleled.

In the course of 100 days, from April to July 1994, 800,000 people were

killed, mostly Tutsi and some politically moderate Hutu (Power, 334).

Again, just as in

Bosnia, the U.S. had advance warning from its own government agencies. By 1992, the
Rwandan Hutu militia had purchased, stockpiled, and started distributing 85 tons of
munitions and 581,000 machetes (Power, 337).

In 1993, two CIA studies warned of

large-scale ethnic violence and that around four million tons of small arms had been
transferred from Poland to Rwanda, via Belgium (Power, 338).

in receiving warnings of the bloodshed to come.

The U.S. was not alone

Astonishingly, in January 1994, the

commander of U.N. forces in Rwanda, Canadian Major General Romeo Dallaire, sent
information he had received from an anonymous Hutu informant in the Rwandan
government describing the arming and training of militias and plans to provoke and kill

several Belgian peacekeepers to ensure the withdrawal of the rest (Power, 334). This
exact plan was carried out a few months later. Obviously, the signs were there before the
atrocities began, but what about after the killing had started? How much did the U.S. and
the U.N. know about the motivations and the scale of the massacre?

By two days after the killing started on April 6, 1994, Dallaire knew that ethnicity
was a major factor; it was clear that simply having a Tutsi identification card was enough

1]

to get someone killed (Power, 349). These were not political killings. A few days later,
about two dozen U.S. special forces were sent on a one-day mission to Kigali and
returned describing “so many bodies on the streets that you could walk from one body to
the other without touching the ground,” according to one officer (Power, 354). Finally,
by April 19, Human Rights Watch estimated the number of dead at 100,000, which in the
end turned out to be a “gross underestimation” (Power, 357). Obviously, this constituted
genocide. The witnesses on the ground recognized it; the human rights groups
recognized it; all that was left was for the United States government to state the obvious,
live up to its obligations under the Genocide Convention and as the most powerful nation
in the world, and either mobilize the U.N. to stop the killing or do so on its own.
Unfortunately, the same strategy that had been used in Bosnia was employed with
Rwanda, even in the face of overwhelming evidence of genocide. A paper on Rwanda
prepared by an official in the Office of the Secretary of Defense dated May 1 stated, “Be
careful. Legal at State was worried about this yesterday — Genocide finding could
commit [the U.S. government] to actually ‘do something.””’ Clearly, tactics had not
changed since Bosnia. Tutsi rebels finally ended the genocide in July, occupying most of
the country after Secretary of State Warren Christopher had finally acknowledged that
what was happening in Rwanda was in fact genocide less than a month earlier (Power,
362). By the time Christopher did admit what was happening, human rights groups were
estimating between 200,000 and 500,000 deaths, which again turned out to be an

underestimation (Power, 364). Once again, the United States government had made itself
clear without saying a word.

In fact, by not saying the word, the American government

had excused itself from any responsibilities and made its policy toward genocide and
” Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Secret Discussion Paper: Rwanda,” May |, 1994; emphasis added.
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other human rights violations perfectly clear. If the Americans would not step in to stop

genocide, then what hope was there that the U.S. would stand up for the victims of other
human rights violations?

As both Rwanda and Bosnia showed, American foreign policy had not changed
since the Cold War in spite of the treaties the U.S. had ratified; administrations just had to
become more clever in the ways they avoided intervening on behalf of human rights. The
fundamental question then becomes simply, why?

Why does the United States sign

treaties and then find any way possible to avoid its responsibilities under them? Why
does it refuse to sign other treaties and international agreements at all? What are the
factors that dictate the place of human rights in U.S. foreign policy, or the lack thereof?
Foreign policy in general is simply a country’s practice of international politics.
In the case of the American system, until World War II, foreign policy was viewed as
beyond the realm of politics; “the country would unite behind policy, rather than haggle
and disagree, as was the case in internal politics” (Snow, 1). After the end of World War
II and with the start of the Cold War, foreign and domestic policy became increasingly
intertwined and subject to partisan debates (Snow, |). “International politics are
inherently power politics,” and states use whatever power they have to protect their
interests in their exercise of foreign policy (Snow, 4). So, what are those interests, how
have they influenced American foreign policy, and what place have human rights
occupied in that policy? In this thesis I will explore the domestic, geopolitical, and
economic factors that have shaped American foreign policy in the area of human rights
after the Cold War and which dictate the seemingly immovable doctrine of inaction and
nonintervention on behalf of those who are being oppressed and even killed.

13
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In the years since the start of the Cold War, “the distinction between foreign and

domestic politics has virtually disappeared and will continue to do so” (Snow, 2).
and political
Foreign policy, just like domestic policy, is shaped by a nation’s values

culture, or in this case, its “foreign policy culture” (Snow, 8). American foreign policy
with a special
culture has been dominated by the idea that the U.S. is a “special state
like Ronald
destiny,” and that it is a role model for the world, as evidenced by images
Reagan’s “shining house on the hill” (Snow, 9). These factors, combined with the new
policy since
“haggling” and partisan debates over policy, have shaped American foreign
partisan
World War II. In this thesis, domestic influences such as public opinion,
ally in the cases of the
politics, and special interest lobbying on foreign policy, specific
be examined.
International Criminal Court and the Genocide Convention, will

These

participate in the international
cases are excellent examples of American unwillingness to
partisan domestic concerns
justice process both before and after the Cold War because of
contrast to the American
over popularity and semantic arguments, and they stand in sharp
ideal of being an example of freedom.

Even when the United States stands to lose

these cases show how
nothing more than a small slice of its foreign aid budget,
agendas than actually
politicians care more about their public images or petty partisan
helping people.
policy has been the
Another dominant theme in the history of American foreign
II, the presence of the
nation’s isolationist tendency (Snow, 9). At the end of World War

player
Soviet Union made U.S. isolationism impossible, and American became a major
on the world stage of global politics, but still a somewhat reluctant one when it came to
international action and agreements.

This balance between the necessity for involvement
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and the natural inclination toward isolationism have produced sometimes contradictory
interests that have played a major role in dictating America’s foreign policy. American
geopolitical motivations will therefore be taken into account, particularly regarding the
American relationship with the Turkish government, the lack of support for the
Cambodian Genocide Tribunals, and in the area of hegemon theory. These motivations
include military interests, America’s self-image, and its willingness to participate in
international politics. This section will show how every international system needs a
superpower to function and keep everyone else in line, and how the U.S. has been
unwilling to play this role even on the periphery of international hot spots like the Middle
East (Turkey).
After the end of the Cold War, economic concerns became prominent for the
world’s wealthiest nations (Snow, 7). Naturally, these concerns are reflected in policies

toward other countries. Therefore, the economic influences on human rights policy that
prevent intervention will be discussed through an examination of U.S. relations with
China and Saudi Arabia, particularly the influences of business lobbying and oil ties as
factors in United States foreign policy formulation.

As two of America’s most important

trading partners and also two of the world’s most totalitarian regimes and notorious
human rights violators, these countries are prime examples of American hypocrisy when
it comes to even mild condemnations of human rights violations.

In researching this thesis, several primary sources have been consulted, including
international treaties and agreements, Congressional hearings, public opinion polls, and
an interview with a former United States ambassador.

In addition, secondary sources in

the form of news articles, scholarly articles, and books will be used in the analysis of

what has and has not been done by the American government over the past 20 to 30 years
in the areas of human rights. All of these sources will be utilized to help explain
America’s consistently frustrating record on human rights issues and lack of action to
help those in need.
In the following chapters, the influences of domestic, geopolitical, and economic
factors on U.S. human rights foreign policy will be examined. The next chapter will deal
with domestic factors, using the specific cases of American opposition to the Genocide
Convention and the International Criminal Court. The third chapter looks at geopolitical
factors through studies of the cases of U.S. response to the Cambodian genocide, human
rights abuses in Turkey, and finally by examining America’s role as the sole remaining
superpower and hegemon in the international system.

In the fourth chapter, economic

influences will be examined, using U.S. trade and human rights policies with two
notorious human rights violators, China and Saudi Arabia.
Finally, in conclusion, I will deal with how all these various factors have
combined to create a consistent American foreign policy throughout at least the twentieth
century, even through changes in administrations and majority parties. Then, I will
reexamine Schlesinger’s argument that ideology is such a monstrously flawed way to
view the world and international relations by looking at the emerging body of

international law and the resurgence of idealist thoughts about foreign policy since the
end of the Cold War.

There is, perhaps, a middle ground between realism and pure

ideology that serves both morality and national interest, and it may lie in effectively and

collectively enforced international agreements.
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Chapter 2 — Domestic Factors
If public opinion polls are any indication, the average American citizen is, more
often than not, supportive of the idea of universal human rights and even their promotion
in foreign countries.

In fact, in a 2004 Gallup International poll, 53 percent of Americans

said the world was not making enough progress on improving/maintaining human rights.
In the same year, a poll by the National Opinion Research Center showed that 75 percent
of Americans think that the U.N. should intervene if a country is seriously violating

human rights; it would seem that Americans not only support the abstract idea of human
rights, but also support action to promote them.

Even when it comes to spending money,

66 percent said that U.N. funding to monitor human rights should rise or at least stay at

its present level in a 1995 poll by Wirthlin Group.

The polls also seem to show that

American politicians should be extremely concerned with human rights around the world;
86 percent of the American public said in a February 2005 Gallup poll that “promoting

and defending human rights in other countries” was an important priority of U.S. foreign
policy, while only 10 percent said it was “not too important” and a scant two percent
found it “not important at all.”* If this is the case, then why can U.S. officials and
politicians seemingly ignore global human rights issues with little or no negative impact

on their approval ratings or election results?

* All poll data taken from “Americans and the World:

Human Rights” at http://www.americans-

world.org/digest/global_issues/human_rights/PromotingHR.cfm
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While Americans support the idea of human rights generally, when compared to
other foreign policy concerns, they slip far down the list of priorities.

In a 2004 End of

Year Gallup Poll, only four percent of respondents listed “improving/maintaining human
rights” as the most important priority for world leaders. Public opinion polls in general
show a lack of support for a “costly crusade for human rights abroad” (Forsythe, 4).
Support for intervention declined still further after Somalia in 1993 (Forsythe, 5). In fact,
in 1995, the goals of promoting and defending human rights and helping bring democracy
to other nations ranked 13" and 14" respectively in public opinion polls on which issues
were important in foreign policy (Forsythe, 24). The low status of human rights on the
average American’s list of priorities for foreign policy makes it easy for political figures
to ignore human rights issues without fear of public backlash.

The attitude seems to be

that it would be nice if all politicians cared about human rights in other countries, but a
candidate’s stance one way or the other on the issue is not enough to change a voter’s
mind; however, pressure from influential groups can be enough to cause an issue to be
completely swept under the rug, or it can spur a politician to action on a human rights
issue, even if the group or groups only represent a small minority of the American
population.
The Genocide Convention
The history of the Genocide Convention goes all the way back to the years

immediately following World War II; in December 1946, the U.N. General Assembly
first passed a resolution condemning genocide (Power, 54).

After this, the Genocide

Convention itself took two years to complete, and was finally passed by the GA on
December 9, 1948 (Power, 57).

U.S. State Department lawyers had helped to write the

first draft of the treaty, and the United States was the first country to sign the 1948 pact at
the U.N.; it was quickly endorsed by President Harry Truman the next year (Power, 64).
“When the convention cleared the General Assembly in 1948, few doubted that the
United States would be one of the first countries to ratify it” (Power, 64). Sadly, this was
not to be the case, but why?

There were immediate concerns and criticisms of the treaty from domestic
influences; critics said it was not specific enough about the definition of genocide.

The

American Bar Association, among others, made the claim that there should be a set

number of how many had to be killed in order for a mass murder to qualify as genocide
(Power, 66). In addition, southern Senators were afraid segregation might be construed
as “mental harm” and counted as genocide, and there were concerns about the past
treatment of Native Americans, even though the treaty was not retroactive (Power, 67).
These fears persisted even though there was no way for the United States to be brought
up on charges for past conduct, and even the National Council on Negro Women said that
segregation was clearly not genocide and supported the convention (Power, 67).

As

always with international agreements, some were opposed simply because of their

cooperative, universal nature. “American opposition was rooted in a traditional hostility
toward any infringement on U.S. sovereignty, which was amplified by the red scare of
the 1950s” (Power, 69).

In fact, the primary instigator of the red scare, Senator Joseph

McCarthy, and his allies opposed all U.N. instruments as “vehicles of world government
and socialism that would swallow U.S. sovereignty and aid in a Communist plot to
rule...the world” (Power, 76).

These concerns about sovereignty and the fear that an

enemy could file “trumped-up” charges against the U.S. under the Convention were
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irrelevant, since this could be done even if the U.S. did not ratify; obviously, this has
never happened (Power, 68). Fear and ignorance, the enemies of all progress, bred the
opposition to the Genocide Convention in America, and for nearly forty years after the
United States was the first signatory to the Convention, fear and ignorance prevented it
from being ratified.
The Genocide Convention did have its supporters in Congress.

Senator William

Proxmire of Wisconsin made a speech a day on the Senate floor in support of ratification
every day that Congress was in session from January 11, 1967 for the next 19 years
(Power, 79).

However, this was not enough to convince his fellow senators to do

anything, until a certain public relations disaster in 1985.

In April of that year, President

Ronald Reagan was invited to Germany for a diplomatic visit and went to a German
cemetery where several Nazi officials were buried; on the same trip, he declined

invitations to visit several Holocaust memorials (Power, 161).

Obviously, this garnered

him a great deal of bad publicity, especially with the American Jewish community.
Because of this public relations fiasco, Reagan determined to push the Genocide

Convention’s ratification through the Senate to make amends.

Even with the president’s

backing, the Convention’s opponents insisted on various “RUDs” — reservations,

understandings, and declarations — that watered down the treaty’s purpose (Power, 163).
These were the reservations that later led to objections from so many well-respected

democratic governments.
The defanged version of the Genocide Convention was finally ratified on
February 11, 1986, thanks to a president’s bungled publicity campaign (Power, 165).
Once the treaty was ratified, it took another two years for the Senate to pass an
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implementation act (The Genocide Convention Implementation Act) in 1988 to make

genocide a punishable crime in the United States (Power, 168). The battle for ratification
of the Convention is a perfect example of the influence of public opinion and lobbying on
American foreign policy; the lobbying of a few ignorant senators and groups held up
ratification for nearly forty years, and one single mistake that led to intense lobbying by

one small, but powerful minority group within American society led the Convention to be
ratified within a year. Once it was no longer politically safe for the president to ignore
the Genocide Convention, it was ratified; other international agreements have yet to
garner such attention.

As long as it is still safe for indifferent politicians to ignore these

treaties and allow their opponents to dominate debate, they will never be ratified and
enforced by the world’s lone remaining superpower.

This is especially true when

vehement opponents of international agreements think they can score domestic political
points by opposing an international agreement that few Americans know about through

misleading legislation and cheap scare tactics. Using this strategy, an international body
designed with even most universally commendable goals can be vilified and rejected by
the American government.
The International Criminal Court

Since the creation of the United Nations after World War II and the proliferation
of international treaties, conventions, and agreements, there has been a growing need for
some authoritative institution to enforce the constantly burgeoning body of international

law. The U.N. Security Council has established independent tribunals to deal with some
human rights offenses (Rwanda, Yugoslavia, and Cambodia being the most noteworthy),
but the idea of an international judicial body to handle such cases has finally come full

circle in the Rome Treaty that established the International Criminal Court in 1998
(Wedgwood).

The United States had been a constant advocate of the creation of this

court throughout the 1990s, with both President Bill Clinton and Secretary of State

Madeleine Albright expressing their support (Wedgwood).

However, when the Rome

Conference finally came and the U.S. was given an opportunity to help shape the Court
and give its formal backing, America found itself in an unsavory minority in opposition
to its creation, joining states like Libya, Iraq, and Yemen, among others (Wedgwood).

A

large part of the reason for this opposition was the fact that American negotiators did not

have a chance to design the Court as they wished and in a fashion that the U.S.
government would support, since they did not receive instructions from the
administration until four weeks into the five-week conference (Wedgwood).

Obviously,

the ICC and probably human rights in general were far down the list of the

administration’s priorities, and this resulted in a court that many in the U.S. opposed
because of misunderstandings, unfounded criticisms, and a general mistrust of
international agreements.
In hearings before the House International Relations Committee in July 2000,

former Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs and future U.N.
Ambassador John R. Bolton, along with former Secretary of State Lawrence S.
Eagleburger, testified and voiced their opposition to the ICC (U.S. Congress).

Both men

obviously opposed the creation of the ICC, but Bolton’s criticisms were particularly
pointed and his opposition was vehement.

He began his testimony with the automatic

assumption that the development of the Court had been “disastrous” for the United States
and that it was “out of control” (U.S. Congress, 3).

Bolton went on to call the very idea

of the Court “objectionable” and “based largely on emotional appeals to an abstract ideal
of an international judicial system” (U.S. Congress, 4). Once he was finished bashing the

very idea of an international judicial body, Bolton went on to list his substantive
objections.

He had three major problems with the Court. First, the ICC would not deter
crimes against humanity because it “will not and should not have the authority it needs to
be an effective deterrent;” in Bolton’s words, how can judges stop “what cold steel has
failed to prevent” (U.S. Congress, 4)?

Second, he said that international justice is not

always consistent with the “attainable political resolution of serious political and military
disputes” (U.S. Congress, 4). Finally, and this was Bolton’s biggest concern, the Court
and prosecutor might become too strong, especially since the prosecutor was not
“politically accountable” (U.S. Congress, 5). Bolton also listed several other concerns,
including the fact that the treaty was binding even if the U.S. was not a signatory, the
claim that the President and Cabinet members might be arrested in unfriendly countries,

the lack of a jury trial, and what he termed a fuzzy definition of “aggression” in

international law (U.S. Congress, 5). His final recommendation on the ICC was that the
United States offer “no financial support, directly or indirectly, no collaboration, and no
further negotiation with other governments to try and improve it” (U.S. Congress, 6).

Former Secretary Eagleburger’s testimony, while not as inflammatory, was similar. He
agreed with Bolton’s three objections and stressed the fact that many signatories to the
treaty were not democratic states and the U.S. might someday need to act in its own

interests without international support (U.S. Congress, 8). Eagleburger’s main concern
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was the U.S. being brought up on false charges of war crimes. “We will find ourselves

being charged with war crimes by those who have no business in the business of charging
war crimes” (U.S. Congress, 9).

At first glance, all of these objections certainly seem

legitimate, and if they are, there would be no reason to criticize the American government

for not joining the Court.

But do the criticisms hold up when compared to the facts?

In fact, even with unclear instructions and very little time to negotiate, the Rome
Treaty was changed in a few ways to pacify U.S. concerns.

For example, national

security information was privileged from the Court, and the ICC prosecutor was forced to
give advance notice to any country whose troops might be investigated (Wedgwood).

But what about the jurisdictional concerns and, even more importantly, the concerns
about the accountability of the prosecutor?

Contrary to Bolton’s assertions, the ICC

prosecutor is politically accountable; he can be removed by a simple majority vote of
signatories to the treaty if he acts irresponsibly, and even judges can be removed by a
two-thirds vote (Roth).

As for Bolton’s account of the seemingly unlimited jurisdiction

of the Court, this too is a misconception.

Actually, “the ICC will only step in if local

courts have collapsed or the country shows a ‘genuine unwillingness’ to act in good
faith” (Wedgwood).

As for Bolton’s concern over the definition of aggression, he had no

real reason to worry, since aggression was not listed as an offense over which the Court
had jurisdiction in the original treaty, and amendments to the treaty require the support of
seven-eighths of signatories, a margin that would be nearly impossible to obtain with
anything less than a crystal clear definition (Wedgwood).

As for the lack of a jury trial,

soldiers in American courts-martial also do not receive a trial by jury, and the U.S. often
extradites to countries that lack jury trials as long as they “otherwise observe basic due
process” (Roth).

Most of the substantive procedural criticisms of the Court are largely

unfounded and sometimes simply unimportant, given what American negotiators were
willing to accept in the treaty. While the independent prosecutor was a large concern, the
U.S. seemed to have no problem with the fact that any state party can refer investigations
to the Court without Security Council approval (Wedgwood).

A prosecutor who will

almost certainly always be a well-respected lawyer from a democratic state, checked by a
panel of judges with the same background, should be of little concern. Rather, the fact
that any state, no matter what its background, can ask the ICC to investigate any other
state should be cause for some alarm. However, even if this were to happen, the
investigation would still have to be cleared through the prosecutor and the panel of
judges. So, if the Court is actually going to work in practice, what about Bolton’s
assertion that there really is no such thing as an international judicial system, that it is all
an “abstract ideal” with no foundation?
There has actually been a very long history of “universal jurisdiction” and
international justice in the global political system.

Even national courts are using the

doctrine more and more frequently to prosecute “despots in their custody for atrocities
committed abroad” (Roth). This concept has been mentioned frequently in the history of
international law and agreements.

Israel’s trial of Adolf Eichmann in 1961 is a prime

example, and universal jurisdiction is mentioned in international treaties to which the
US. is a signatory, including the Torture Convention of 1984 and the Geneva
Conventions of 1949 (Roth).

The Geneva Conventions even go so far as to say that each

state party to the conventions should find those responsible for breaches and “bring such
persons, regardless of nationality, before its own courts” (Roth).

Universal jurisdiction in

individual national courts is already widely accepted and even practiced by the United

States in cases where American courts prosecute foreign terrorists, drug traffickers, and
others without the permission of their governments, such as in the case of former
Panamanian dictator Manuel Noriega (Roth). This practice is also accepted for American
soldiers in foreign countries; under status-of-forces agreements, U.S. soldiers can be
prosecuted by foreign national courts for crimes committed overseas (Roth).

Since this

already seems to be an accepted fact of international law, why not formalize it with an
accountable, consistent institution rather than risking each state arresting anyone found
within its borders that is suspected of a crime? If, as former Sec. Eagleburger said, there
are concerns about being brought up on charges by countries that have no business doing
so, it would be much safer to have a court with standardized assurances of due process
that is held accountable to the United Nations than to risk Americans or anyone else
simply being arrested and brought before a foreign court that might not have any
guarantees of due process.
If the objections to the Court are so shaky, then why was there so much virulent

opposition to it? Was this just another example of hostility toward international
agreements in general, or were there other reasons?

One reason for the hostility toward

the ICC was because some politicians hoped to use the ICC as a tool for domestic
political gain. The legislation that opposed joining the ICC was entitled the “American
Servicemembers’ Protection Act” (U.S. Congress).

Since American servicemembers are

already subject to prosecution in foreign countries where they are stationed, why would
this act be any more of a protection?

As Congressman Tom Lantos, a Democrat from

California, theorized during the hearings on the ICC and the ASPA, many Republican
Congressmen would simply like to get Democratic supporters of the ICC on the record as

voting against protecting American servicemembers, even though the legislation in fact

has very little to do with this (U.S. Congress, 14). Lantos also points out that rather than
isolating itself for political gains at home, the U.S. should realize that non-democratic
states will always exist and will have to be dealt with, and sometimes they can even aid
an American cause, as the Soviets did at Nuremberg (U.S. Congress, 15). In an
increasingly connected world, isolationism in any sense is no longer sound foreign
policy.
Another way to use a foreign policy issue for domestic political gain is to
oversimplify the issue. Since the ICC was not perfect and shaped exactly in America’s
image right from the start, it was much easier for legislators to simply completely oppose
it and sever all potential ties than to risk political backlash by suggesting actual
compromise and work to improve an imperfect idea with great potential. Congressman
Sam Gedjenson of Connecticut pointed out during the hearings on the ICC that the
American Servicemembers’ Protection Act went so far as to make it illegal for the U.S. to
even provide evidence to the ICC (U.S. Congress, 12). Why not talk to the Court, he
asked, and help it when its objectives coincide with American goals and through
cooperation try to improve it so that we might one day be able to join? The American
public was not well-informed of the ICC’s structure and purpose, and much of the time
all they heard was what they were told by their legislators who were using fear of unfair
prosecutions to rally support for their own stance against the Court while vilifying its
supporters as opponents of the American military. Thankfully, this strategy did not work,
and the American Servicemembers’ Protection Act was never passed, leaving the door

open for at least some cooperation with the ICC, although it is doubtful that the U.S. will
join the Court as long as the current administration is in power.
Obviously, there are political influences both within and outside the U.S.
government that are opposed to international agreements, some in general and some only
for specific purposes.

These elements have always existed, and they are constantly

changing; as new agreements are proposed, different elements of the American public
and government arise to oppose them.

But what about the basic structural and

philosophical impediments to promoting and defending human rights abroad? Are there
reasons the U.S. does not intervene simply because of the internal structure of its
government?
Of course, the American government and its bureaucracy are extraordinarily

complex.

This, in addition to the prevailing attitudes since the Vietnam War inside the

Pentagon and in the American public, has made it very difficult for any president to
deploy troops to areas where they might be needed to protect human rights (Forsythe, 6).
This was made even more difficult during the 1990s after Somalia; in fact, it was almost

impossible to deploy troops anywhere without “considerable political risk at home and
strict rules of engagement abroad” (Forsythe, 6). One institutional step that was taken to

at least improve the American government’s awareness of human rights issues after the
establishment of the Human Rights Bureau in the State Department in the 1970s was the
formation of a standing subcommittee in the House of Representatives on the subject in
the 1990s (Forsythe, 6). However, the Human Rights Bureau has historically had very

little influence on any administration’s policy decisions since Carter left office (Forsythe,

24). Can anything make the American public and politicians pay attention to human
rights?
The only factor that truly seems to influence the actions of government officials is
the “CNN factor,” which has been aided in recent years by the proliferation of nongovernmental organizations devoted to human rights such as Human Rights Watch and
Amnesty International that bring much-needed media attention to areas that deserve it
(Forsythe, 25).

These organizations grew and multiplied throughout the 1990s, even in

the face of declining public support for intervention after Somalia. These NGOs still
have yet to exert much significant influence on foreign policy, but as they increase public
awareness, there is always hope that the system might change and make it easier for the
U.S. to intervene on behalf of human rights.
Even with a growing number of organizations and interest groups devoted to the
promotion and protection of human rights, there is still a basic philosophical roadblock to
the United States fully promoting all human rights, especially positive rights.

The

problem is that “the U.S. has never officially accepted economic and social rights as real
rights the state is obligated to respect” (Forsythe, 9). America is almost alone in this
stance: By the late 1990s, almost all nations, even China, had ratified the 1966
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights — the U.S. still has yet

to do so (Forsythe, 3). The problem is the basic philosophical conflict between liberty
and equality. Even in domestic politics, Americans have very little sympathy for the idea
that there can be too much personal freedom, and this often leads to the exploitation of
the poor and weak, both at home and abroad (Forsythe, 22). This prioritization of
freedom over equality has led to the failure of universal healthcare in the United States,

the reduction of welfare benefits, and continued government collaboration with big

business interests at the expense of individuals (Forsythe, 23). The image of the “selfmade man or woman” in the United States is so prevalent that Americans tend to reject
any sort of government handout as unnecessary and an infringement on the freedom of
those who have become self-sufficient. Many Americans simply do not realize the utter
lack of opportunity for advancement in the poorest nations of the world, and these are
often the places where the worst human rights atrocities take place. If they are not even
willing to protect their rights and ensure equality at home, what chance is there that
Americans will be supportive of costly efforts to help those in other countries whose

rights are being violated because they live in a country that has fallen prey to a tyrant
because of a lack of education, jobs, or even something as simple as food and clean
water?

Chapter 3 — Geopolitical Factors
Obviously, political concerns at home often outweigh other factors in formulating
foreign policy, whether they are philosophical ideals, lobbyist pressures, or simply
politicians scoring cheap political points to win reelection. However, as the world’s lone
remaining superpower, the United States often has to balance these domestic issues with

responsibilities in the global community.

Geopolitical concerns often dictate how

America will behave toward regimes with bad human rights records, even genocidal
ones. Geopolitics can be roughly defined as follows:
In the abstract, geopolitics traditionally indicates the links and causal relationships
between political power and geographic space; in concrete terms it is often seen as a body

of thought assaying specific strategic prescriptions based on the relative importance of
land power and sea power in world history... The geopolitical tradition had some
consistent concerns, like the geopolitical correlates of power in world politics, the
identification of international core areas, and the relationships between naval and
terrestrial capabilities —Oyvind Osterud, “The Uses and Abuses of Geopolitics,” Journal
of Peace Research, no. 2, 1988, p. 191

For most of the twentieth century, U.S. foreign policy was seemingly dictated by the
global ideological battles of the Cold War.

The U.S. policy of containment in regards to

the Soviet Union led to an attitude that declared, “The enemy of my enemy is my friend.”
Nowhere was this more evident than in United States policy in Southeast Asia.

After

supporting a corrupt regime in South Vietnam against the arguably greater evil of the
Communist North Vietnamese and failing, the United States again showed its willingness
to back an even more ruthless regime in Vietnam’s neighbor, Cambodia.
Cambodia

After a five-year civil war, the radical Communist Khmer Rouge (KR) regime

took power in Cambodia in April 1975 (Power, 87). During the civil war, the United
States had spent $1.85 billion supporting the KR’s opposition, the government headed by
Lon Nol, who in 1971 and 1972 had stripped citizens of basic freedoms and declared
himself president, prime minister, defense minister, and marshal of the armed forces
(Power, 93).

After the rise of the KR, over the next three and a half years, about two

million Cambodians out of a population of seven million were either executed or starved
to death (Power, 90). As in the case of all genocides, there must be information available
before the outside world can act. In one observer’s view, the KR may well have operated

the “most secretive regime of the twentieth century” (Power, 109). So, did United States
policymakers actually know what was happening? The KR government even went so far
as to cut off almost all foreign trade and reject offers of humanitarian aid from the world
community (Power, 118).

U.S. policymakers were obviously aware of this fact, so they

must have known that the trade embargo they applied during the genocide could not have
been remotely effective, since Cambodia was no longer engaging in international trade
(Haas, 81). What was actually happening in Cambodia, and could the American
government possibly have known what was going on inside the country to stop it?
Soon after Pol Pot took full control of Cambodia in 1977, he began rounding up
“enemies.” Three types of enemies were arrested and almost invariably executed:
capitalists (shopkeepers or traders), feudalists (Buddhists, intellectuals, and royalty), and
imperialists, or ethnic minorities who dressed or spoke differently from the Khmer or
anyone the KR saw fit to accuse of being an agent of the CIA, KGB, or Vietnamese
(Haas, 21). In this way, Pol Pot ensured that there would be only two classes in

Cambodia: peasants and Party members — these were the only “true Cambodians” (Haas,
22). In addition, any peasants who objected to being forced into labor or moved away
from their homes and families were subject to execution on the spot (Haas, 22).
Obviously, the KR had a stranglehold on life in Cambodia, and it did not appear that they
would be willing to relinquish it peacefully or allow for opposing points of view.
Even with the Khmer Rouge’s suffocating policies, numerous refugees managed
to escape Cambodia, and they told their stories to anyone who would listen, including
American State Department officials. Refugees told of the harsh rules imposed by the
KR, including:

Requiring travel passes for any movement, even to cross town;
Citizens were not allowed to feed themselves; in most places, the state provided a
tin or less of rice a day per person;
Only KR tracts were allowed, no other books of any sort; also, it was forbidden to
speak any foreign languages — doing so was punishable by death;
No reminiscing about life before KR rule; families were separated and children

were “reeducated” and taught to inform on parents who might possibly be hiding
their “bourgeois” pasts from the government;
Only the government could authorize sexual relationships; pairings for weddings
were announced en masse at communal assemblies
No praying; Buddhist temples were converted into grain silos;
No private property or money; the National Bank was blown up;
Absolutely no contact with the outside world was allowed (Power, 117-118).

Even in the face of these refugees’ stories, which were consistently corroborated by
others who escaped, during the first three years of KR rule even reporters and diplomats
who were familiar with the situation were reluctant to urge U.S. action because of
lingering memories and sensitivities about Vietnam (Power, 122).

Southeast Asia was a

taboo subject in the American political scene.
Finally, in January 1979, Vietnam invaded Cambodia because of repeated KR
incursions into its territory and dislodged the regime (Power, 141).

It was then that the

United States showed just how far it was willing to go to protect its geopolitical interests
in the global fight against Communism.

After the Vietnamese invasion, the U.S. was so

eager to oppose Moscow in any way possible that it pressured Thailand into serving as a
conduit for Chinese aid to Pol Pot (Haas, 82). The American government had finally

begun to condemn the Khmer Rouge in 1978, but when faced with the option of either
supporting the genocidal regime or supporting the new government installed by the
Vietnamese, the U.S. reversed positions and sided with the KR (Power, 147).

In fact, the

US. indirectly armed the remaining KR forces in the coming years.

U.S. military aid to Thailand was increased after Ronald Reagan took office, and
the Thai government immediately resold weapons to the KR for a profit; apparently, the
KR did not mind paying a hefty price, since they were using Chinese aid money to buy

the weapons anyway (Haas, 84). This was also part of the American geopolitical strategy
that used Cambodia as a pawn.

The American government was trying to reestablish ties

with China at the time, and since the Chinese were the biggest (and, outside of the ULS.,
only) supporters of the KR’s rule, the U.S. encouraged China in its efforts to supply the
ousted KR rebels with arms (Power, 147).

In addition, by supplying Vietnam’s (and by

proxy, the Soviet Union’s) enemy with arms, the U.S. was exacting a sort of revenge for
its own military failure. Reagan administration officials wanted the conflict between
Vietnam and Cambodia to drag on for as long as possible, making it “Vietnam’s
Vietnam” (Haas, 85). American support for the KR did not end with covert military aid.
This was only “part of a pattern of aid for the perpetrators of a successful Holocaust”
(Haas, ix). In 1979, the American government also pressured its Asian allies to help in
the formation of a three-party coalition government in Cambodia that included Pol Pot

(Haas, 50). U.S. support for giving the genocidal dictator a role in Cambodia’s future
government continued throughout the decade, even after the fall of the Berlin Wall.
In 1990, Pol Pot’s own radio station applauded U.S. policy as “very correct”

(Haas, 252). What more blatant sign of flawed policy could there be than praise from a
genocidal maniac?

That same year at the Paris Conference on Cambodia, American

officials again made Pol Pot proud.

Although the U.S. representative’s opening

statements at the conference opposed including Pol Pot’s faction in any interim
government, U.S. delegates ended up backing a coalition government that included the
KR (Haas, 252).

Even in the United Nations after the fall of Pol Pot’s regime, the U.S.

supported the KR government receiving credentials as the official representatives of the
Cambodian people (Power, 150).

Unfortunately, America won this battle as well.

The

Cold War, however, was a very special circumstance in American history that forced the
US. government into difficult choices, often simply between the lesser of two evils.

Surely, once this paradigm of democracy vs. communism was broken, the Soviet Union
had fallen, and America was free to act based on right and wrong, this policy of
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supporting genocidal regimes would change.

In 1990, when the Paris peace accords were negotiated between the rival factions
vying for control of Cambodia, including the KR, one of the main points of contention
during the conference was whether or not to include the word “genocide” in reference to
the KR’s actions during its rule. Because of the influence of the United States and China,
the word was not included (Power, 154).

Perhaps the most shameful of U.S. actions

regarding Cambodia, however, is the fact that, because of previous legislation that bars
loans to the current Cambodian government, the United States has refused to provide any

financial assistance to the U.N.-backed tribunal that was formed in 2003 to try former KR
officials for genocide (Cohen).

Although a resolution was proposed in the House to

financially support the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the
Prosecution of Crimes Committed during the Period of Democratic Kampuchea in March

2004, it was never brought to the floor.’ Therefore, the tribunal must struggle along with
a $9.6 million shortage in funding (Hinton).

Given the expense of international tribunals,

this makes it nearly impossible for the Extraordinary Chambers to do their job efficiently.
This has contributed to the fact that, although the tribunal was established nearly

four years ago, as of August, 2006, “not a single high-ranking Khmer Rouge leader has
been held accountable or has taken responsibility” for the Cambodian genocide (Hinton).

The United States does not support the current Cambodian regime because of its
questionable human rights record and other concerns”, which is understandable and even

commendable. but the tribunals are not a part of the Cambodian government.

According

to the website for the Extraordinary Chambers, the court “was created by the U.N. and
the government but it will be independent of them.

It is a Cambodian court with

* http://www.thomas.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d108:HC00399:@@@D&summ2=m&
' http://www.thomas.gov/cgi-bin/query/F2c105:236:./temp/~mdbsunL
Kii:e 138297:

international participation that will apply international standards.”''

According to the

rules of the court, those accused of crimes will be ensured basic due process as is
generally agreed upon in international law, including the presumption of innocence until
proven guilty, the right to be informed of charges against them, a right against selfincrimination, etc.!?

American politicians are too slow to recognize changes in the U.S.’s own
geopolitical interests.

Because of leftover legislation from the 1990s, America refuses to

atone for mistakes made during the Cold War and help to prosecute the perpetrators of a
genocide who were once supported by flawed American policy. Times and
circumstances change. The U.S. must realize that just because it was forced by the
circumstances of the Cold War to support genocidal dictators, this does not mean that

policies cannot be altered to prosecute criminals now that the threat of communism has
been diminished. Even now, when faced with regimes that are still committing crimes
against humanity, the U.S. is still likely to look the other way in the interest of
geopolitical goals.
Turkey

Since the end of the Cold War, the biggest “hot spot” for global conflict has been
the Middle East. With the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, two wars in Iraq, the fight against
the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, and the threat of a nuclear Iran, America has
been faced with challenges on many fronts in the region.
is so vital to U.S. interests are oil and the war on terror.

The two main reasons this area
Oil, of course, has become more

and more vital to the American economy over the course of the twentieth century and

"' http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/about_eccc.aspx
http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/cabinet/files/IR_ECCC

Draft-Internal-Rules.pdf

into the twenty-first. The war on terror seems to have provided the new focus for
American foreign policy since the Cold War; it is the new American “cause” (Hoffman,
232). Therefore, any allies America may have in the Middle East are vital both
economically and strategically. Turkey has been one strategic ally that is so important to
U.S. goals in the region (partially because it shares a border with both Iraq and Iran) that

America has been willing to overlook its human rights abuses.
Stability in Turkey has been a key goal of the United States government for the
past 15 to 20 years in particular because of its location (Barkey, 368).

Turkey’s

government has been supported throughout successive U.S. administrations, particularly
by the Department of Defense (Barkey, 377).

Once again, this is a case of the American

government valuing stability over democracy and human rights. Throughout the 1990s,
there were significant human rights abuses and restrictions upon freedom imposed by the

Turkish government in relation to the Kurdish insurrection and the revival of Islam
(Barkey, 364-365).

These included massive use of force, military coups, and the

suppression of free speech, the outlawing of peaceful protests by the Islamist Welfare

Party and others, and finally the forced resignation of the elected Islamist-led coalition
government in 1997 by the military and secular allies (Barkey, 369).

Apparently, the

U.S. is willing to support a country in its official foreign policy that will not allow its
democratically elected government to stand, or even permit protest.

After the military and its allies regained power from the ousted elected
government, they cracked down even harder on basic freedoms of speech and the press.
The Turkish government arrested and prosecuted journalists, politicians, political parties,
NGOs, and activists for alleged “thought crimes,” stifling both the media and political

activity (Barkey, 372). Rather than meeting global expectations and requirements to join
the EU, Turkey’s human rights abuses have continued.

The State Department Human

Rights Bureau’s 1999 and 2000 reports documented continued limits on basic freedoms,

including the facts that “books and newspapers are routinely banned,” politicians and
activists are arrested and prosecuted, and human rights associations are closed down “at
will” (Barkey, 389). After September 11, as “the Bush administration was constantly
showcasing Turkey as a role model for Islamic nations,” the State Department continued
to criticize its human rights record (Barkey, 394). Even after a new government pledged
to meet EU requirements for admission that included more freedom for political
participation, the Turkish government was still forcibly shutting down political parties as
late as 2003 (Barkey, 395). Turkish abuses have not just been in the area of freedom of
conscience, however.

Internal conflicts have resulted in physical abuses by the

government as well.
The Kurds have always been a people without a home in the Middle East, and

they have been continually persecuted in Iraq, Iran, and Turkey.

The Turks, just like the

other two governments that are continually condemned for their human rights abuses
against the Kurds, have been cruel as well, using forced village evacuations and torture to
deal with the Kurdish insurrection in the country (Barkey, 370). These actions have not
been hidden by the Turkish government over the past two decades.

The State

Department’s Human Rights Bureau has included them in its reports continually.

Of

course, as is almost always the case, the influence of these reports has been weak
(Barkey, 378). In fact, even after all these abuses, the United States has continued to sell
arms to the Turks except in a select few instances, and even pursued the sale of 145

attack helicopters worth $3.5 billion to the Turkish government in 2000 (Barkey, 376).
According to the U.S. Institute of Peace’s 20-year assessment of American Human Rights
Policy,
“Wholesale destruction of Kurdish villages by Turkish troops led the (Human
Rights) Bureau to call for a ban on transfer of U.S. military equipment that would
be used for counterinsurgency purposes. Worried that angered Turkish politicians
might restrict use of Turkish air bases, from which the no-fly zone in northern
Iraq was being enforced, the U.S. embassy in Ankara insisted that the equipment
in question really was for potential use against the Syrians or Iranians. Although
the Bureau had reports from the military attaches clearly stating the
counterinsurgency intent, we lost, and the Turks were given more surplus
American military helicopters.”'?

America not only condones Turkey’s human rights violations, it has helped to arm the
country’s military to better suppress its citizens and force them to leave their homes and
be tortured.

With the world’s most powerful nation on its side, what incentive does

Turkey (or any other human rights violator with U.S. support) have to change its ways?

More importantly, what message does this send to other ruthless regimes around the
world about the risks involved in violating the human rights of their own people?
Hegemon Theory

As the world’s only remaining superpower, the United States has the ability to
create a worldwide human rights regime that could enforce international laws and hold

violators accountable.

According to hegemon theory, there must be a willing hegemon in

any system in order to create a regime, and weaker states must be willing to defer to the
hegemon (Evans, 101).

After World War II, the United States gave early support to

creating this human rights regime, helping to create the U.N. and to draft documents like
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Genocide Convention.

However,

'’ http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/websites/usip/Www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr990616.pdf
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because of Cold War pressures, America had to back off in order to keep strategic weaker
states on its side (Evans, 102). Cambodia is just one of many examples of such weaker
states with undemocratic, oppressive regimes that were supported by official U.S. policy
in its efforts to contain the global threat of Soviet influence and Communism in general.
Obviously, the end of the Cold War did not end the practice of supporting oppressive
regimes, as has been seen in the continued flawed policies toward Cambodia and
American support of and alliances with governments in places such as Saudi Arabia and
Turkey.
Perhaps the most important aspect of hegemon theory is the idea that once a
hegemon sets up a regime, it must follow its own rules or risk losing respect (Evans,

103). With the Nuremberg Trials and the creation and early support of the United
Nations, the U.S. certainly started off setting a strong example for the path toward a

universal human rights regime.

Of course, Cold War politics led to America’s flaunting

of its own ideals, and there were further examples of misconduct by the United States

government after the fall of the Soviet Union: among others, refusal to pay U.N. dues in
the 1990s, failures to act in Bosnia, Rwanda, and Sudan, and alleged atrocities by the

American government and military in Iraq at Abu Ghraib and at Guantanamo Bay. These
actions, plus American failure to ratify International Agreements like the International
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights and debilitating reservations to the

Genocide Convention, have led to a lack of respect for America in the realm of human
rights worldwide.

More seriously, however, there has been a shift in the general

American philosophy on foreign policy since the Bush Administration came to power

that has caused the U.S. to decline as a respectable hegemon in the global human rights
regime.
Because of its “geographically privileged” position, the United States has always
been able to model its foreign policy around the idea that it is exceptional in the
community of nations, mostly because of the perceived universality of its values
(Hoffman, 225).

After World War II, however, the U.S. knew it could not achieve its

goals alone — thus the formation of the United Nations — however, it seems that postSeptember 11 America has forgotten this important lesson (Hoffman, 238).

The roots of

this new policy paradigm were evident from the early 90s. “After the Cold War, the U.S.
talked about a new world order, but what they faced was a bewildering and disorderly
new world” (Hoffman, 227).

The Defense Planning Guidance draft of 1992, sometimes

called “Dick Cheney’s masterwork,” introduces explicitly the idea of the possible
necessity of unilateral action and the preemptive use of force (Hoffman, 228).

This

philosophy was grounded in the idea that, as the lone remaining superpower, allies are
“less necessary” for the U.S. to achieve its goals (Hoffman, 230).

The 1992 draft was

finally fleshed out and put into practice in the September 2002 “National Security

Strategy of the United States of America” that talks about “organizing coalitions, but also
about not hesitating to act alone for self-defense” (Hoffman, 233).

The obvious difficulty

in balancing these two ideas can be seen immediately, but how did this strategy play out

in practice?
Even before September 11, U.S. suspicion of global institutions and international
law was evident.

The rejection of the Kyoto Protocol, withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic

Missile Treaty, and refusal to join the land-mine and comprehensive test ban treaties,

along with the “vendetta” against the International Criminal Court, “conducted — largely
but not explicitly by John Bolton” demonstrated that America was no longer willing to
play by the rules of the regime it had so carefully constructed in the 1940s and 50s
(Hoffman, 229). The inconsistencies of new U.S. policy are bound to cause
complications. If the standard for a successful regime is a hegemon willing to
consistently follow its own rules, the U.S. fails to even remotely live up to this
responsibility. Using the new “cause” of the war on terror to order the post-Cold War
disorder of global politics, the U.S. extended its crusade to states with weapons of mass
destruction — but only those that are hostile to the U.S. (for example, dire predictions
about Iran and North Korea, but nothing about Israel, Pakistan, or India), inciting other
nations to adopt the American doctrine for their own ends (Hoffman, 233).

Other

problems include the fact that the United States has seen fit to employ the doctrine of
unilateral preemption in Iraq, but constantly warns other states not to use the same
rationale as a pretext for aggression (Hoffman, 233). Who is to decide what is aggression
and what is a necessary self-defensive strike?
Obviously this will not be left up to any international institution, because as hard

as the U.S. pushed for Serbia to turn Slobodan Milosevic over to The Hague, it has
seriously undermined the ICC by refusing to accept its jurisdiction (Hoffman, 234). Iraq
was seen as the perfect place to test out the new U.S. doctrine of unilateralism and
exceptionalism because of its strategic location and its oil (Hoffman, 236). After the
resulting chaos, what can the United States expect if other nations with weaker militaries
follow its example of preemptive strikes in the name of national security? “(M)aintaining
deterrence rather than preemption as an international standard is of the highest moral and

legal importance” (Hoffman, 238). As the sole remaining superpower and supposed
hegemon in the regimes of international order and human rights, what message is the
United States sending by ignoring the precedents of international law, multilateralism,
and deterrence that it worked so hard to set up and even perpetuate during the Cold War
with its doctrine of containment through alliances rather than direct military
confrontation?
Finally, it is also possible to see the interaction of domestic interests with
geopolitical strategy in hegemon theory. If domestic interests within the hegemon realize
that less powerful states are gaining an advantage through the rules of the regime, they
will attempt to influence policy to their own advantages (Evans, 103).

Obviously, one

glaring example of this is American friendliness toward oil-producing states with
autocratic regimes.

Another, perhaps less publicized action that influences geopolitics, is

the American decision to continue subsidizing agriculture, forcing third-world countries
whose only options for legitimate exports are basic foodstuffs out of the market, unable
to compete with American corporate farms that are subsidized to keep prices low.

Even

worse than ignoring human rights in its own policies, selfish American domestic actions

can also serve to undermine the efforts of the rest of the global community to protect
human rights, as in the case of the ICC.

Of course, as has already been discussed,

sometimes domestic interest groups can serve as a catalyst in the right direction, as when
the American Jewish community pressured President Reagan into pushing for ratification
of the Genocide Convention.

Unfortunately, there have not been enough domestic

interests in the United States in favor of human rights above all other policy goals to
force the American government to be the “willing hegemon” in the global human rights
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regime, allowing other domestic concerns, geopolitical aims, and economic priorities to

take precedence and dictate U.S. foreign policy.

Chapter 4 — Economic Factors
For any country to be classified as a superpower and maintain this status, it
obviously must have a strong economy both domestically and globally.

The failure of the

Soviet Union demonstrated that the idea of self-sufficiency was unrealistic in the modern

world. The United States has long been an economic superpower, even before it had
such great political clout, and American policymakers have gone to great lengths to

ensure that this stability and prosperity continues in the face of global and domestic
challenges. One of the major ways that the United States economy has been able to ~
maintain its high levels of growth and wealth is through the opening and engaging of
different global markets to ensure free trade and access to important natural resources.
Obviously, to maintain a competitive market in the global economy and to be as

prosperous as possible, the U.S. must be able to trade with other major world economies
and have secure supplies of the most valuable of all resources in today’s world, oil.

Opening new markets and extending the American sphere of influence in the
economic world has always been a key to economic growth.

The U.S. has been adept at

finding and engaging new trade partners historically, and sometimes has done so
regardless of what sort of government is in charge of those nations. Before the 1979
revolution in Iran, the U.S. supported the oppressive government of the shah in order to

maintain oil supplies and Middle Eastern security, and there have been many other
instances where the U.S. has opened up new markets, both with good governments and

bad. Obviously, one of the most influential and relatively new entrants to the community
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of global economic powers has been China. The Chinese success story of going from an
agrarian collective society to a manufacturing giant has been unprecedented, and
obviously the U.S. was quick to capitalize on the new money-making opportunities in the
country. This, combined with China’s universally recognized shortcomings in the area of
human rights, makes it a perfect case study for examining American trading ties with
human rights violators.
After the fall of the shah in Iran and the takeover of the government by the
unfriendly Islamic regime, America came to rely more than ever on Saudi Arabian oil.

While quick to deplore the human rights abuses of the repressive regimes of the
ayatollahs in Iran, the U.S. has been conspicuously silent re

garding the lack of basic freedoms and heavy-handed policies of the Saudi royal family
which controls America’s second-largest supply of foreign oil. Even as the theocratic
government of Iran was included in the so-called “Axis of Evil,” the U.S. government has

maintained amiable ties with the fundamentalist autocrats of the Saudi royal family. The
longstanding historical relationship between the American government and the House of
Saud, and the consistency with which the royals have governed their country throughout

the twentieth century and into the twenty-first provides ample material for taking a close
look at how the U.S. handles human rights issues in a major oil-producing partner. While
other major oil partners may also have human rights issues (such as Venezuela), none are
as long-running and long-ignored by the U.S. as the Saudis’.
China
One of the largest emerging economies of the past few decades has been China’s.

By 1999, China was America’s fourth-largest trade partner (Lampton, 113). China’s

47

GDP rose steadily from just under US$400 billion in 1985 to over US$600 billion in
1994 (Morris, 72). China’s GDP growth rates since 1980 have been above five percent
every year but two and reached double digits four times in the 1990s.'* In contrast,
throughout the 1990’s, U.S. real GDP growth fluctuated between two and 3.5 percent.’
This is not to say that China’s economy became larger than America’s, but it was
certainly on the rise as a force to be reckoned with in the global market, and this meant
that U.S. companies were extremely eager to cash in on the rapid growth in the Chinese
economy.

In 1997, almost 10 percent of foreign investment in China was from the

United States (Lampton, 115). By the next year, 250,000 Chinese worked in Americaninvested firms (Lampton, 116).

All of this meant that the U.S. had a strong interest in

keeping China’s economy strong, but at what cost? At the same time that the Chinese
economy was booming, its domestic human rights policies were lagging far behind global
standards and certainly behind those standards that Americans claimed were so important
to them.
The Chinese government has a long history of swiftly crushing any opposition
and ensuring that opinions different from those of the official party line are never heard.
Dissenters are dealt with harshly and silenced not just for the moment, but sometimes
indefinitely. In 1998, Amnesty International reported that there were still a significant
number of Chinese in prison for participating in the peaceful pro-democracy protests of
1989 or for simply listening to the Voice of America radio network (Morris, 2). In
addition, 80 percent of executions worldwide in 1998 occurred in China, according to

Amnesty — | ,067 out of a total 1,625 (Morris, 2). Obviously, the most glaring example of

"* http://www.chinability.com/GDP.htm
'S http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/Americas/United-States-ECONOMY.
html
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Chinese disregard for human rights was the violent suppression of the 1989 protests, most
notably the Tiananmen Square massacre.

In the following years, more examples became

evident.
While China has yet to ratify major international agreements on human rights like
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,'° even when the government
does commit to agreements, it is unwilling to follow through on them.

In August 1992,

the Chinese signed a bilateral Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Prison Labor
Products with the United States that stipulated that China would not export prison labor
items to the U.S. and that American officials would be allowed to inspect suspected
production sites to ensure compliance.

After only two visits the Chinese refused to allow

any more inspections until 1994 (Lampton, 128). Because of its tumultuous recent
history, China’s government and people have come to place more emphasis on a system
that ensures “order and economic advancement” than freedom and human rights
(Lampton, 132). This has led to the continuation of a historical pattern of abuses and
repression by the Chinese government that U.S. policymakers have never strongly
challenged since the normalization of relations in the late 1970s.
A true human rights bureaucracy within the American government began with the
Carter administration in the late 1970s.

President Carter established the first Bureau of

Humanitarian Affairs and insisted that annual human rights reports on countries receiving
US. aid be provided to Congress (Morris, 52). Despite the implications of these changes,
however, Carter did not discourage private investment in countries with human rights
violations, employing a strict hands-off policy toward trade and investment decisions of
U.S. corporations (Morris, 52). Following the Carter administration, President Ronald
"© http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf

49

Reagan saw human rights as more of a political tool than a goal of foreign policy in and
of itself. Unlike Carter, who was not so generous to oppressive leaders anywhere,
Reagan focused human rights policy only on communist violators, while “friendly”
authoritarian regimes were not pressured, such as those in Africa and South America
(Morris, 53). Continuing this trend, President George H.W. Bush accommodated the
worst of Chinese actions with little to no negative response. “The 1989 Chinese
government’s suppression of pro-democracy advocates did not arouse any contemplation
to revoke China’s MFN (most-favored-nation) status” (Morris, 49).

MFN status, the

most powerful economic lever the U.S. has at its disposal (Morris, 67), affords a country

all the lowered tariffs and reductions of trade barriers that all other members of the World
Trade Organization (WTO) receive.'’

Even after the Tiananmen Square massacre on

June 4, 1989, when President Bush imposed a ban on China’s high-level contacts with the
U.S., it ended two weeks later, when Bush sent a mission to Beijing to restore ties
(Morris, 46). It is impossible to tell whether sanctions punishing human rights will be
effective when they have been given no chance to work. This abandoning of
incentives/sanctions before they had been given a chance to work was to become a

recurring theme in U.S. policy toward China.
The Clinton administration at first seemed to signal a change in direction for
American policy regarding Chinese human rights violations. During the 1992 campaign,
Bill Clinton had admonished Bush for his unwillingness to connect human rights
conditionality to China’s renewed MFN status (Morris, 54). In the years preceding the
campaign, a bipartisan coalition in Congress had even forced the administration to pay
attention to the prison labor problem in China, which partially led to the 1992 MOU on
7 http://useconomy.about.com/od/glossary/g/Favored_Nation.htm
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Prison Labor (Lampton, 126). Clinton at first seemed willing to take these sanctions even
further.

In May 1993, President Clinton issued Executive Order 12850, stating that, “The

core of our policy would be a resolute insistence on overall significant progress on human
rights if MFN for China was to be renewed once again” (Morris, 48). There were seven
conditions to be met to ensure that MFN status would be renewed in 1994, but only two
of them were mandatory.

These were that China must “substantially promote the

freedom of emigration objectives” and comply with the 1992 bilateral agreement
concerning prison labor already discussed (Morris, 48). The five other conditions were to
be evaluated by the Secretary of State, and China was expected to show “significant
progress” in all of the following areas: taking steps to adhere to the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, releasing political prisoners, allowing access to prisons by
international humanitarian and human rights organizations to ensure humane treatment,

protecting Tibet’s religious and cultural heritage, and permitting international radio and
television broadcasts into China (Morris, 48).

If the first two conditions were met and

there was progress made in the other five, MFN would be renewed.
In March 1994, when Secretary of State Warren Christopher visited China to
evaluate the progress made, the Chinese government deliberately detained some political
dissidents to show that they would not give in to U.S. pressure on human rights issues
(Morris, 55).

However, when Christopher returned home to the U.S., he did report that

the two mandatory conditions had in fact been met, but the other five had not. The
Chinese government had even signed a Statement of Cooperation to “improve
implementation of the MOU” (Lampton, 128). After reporting this information,
Christopher left it up to Clinton to decide whether to renew China’s MEN status. Clinton

then decided to renew MEN, and on May 26, 1994 he reversed his former policy and
declared that there would no longer be a link between human rights and MFN status
(Morris, 56). Instead, Clinton began encouraging voluntary codes of conduct for U.S.
corporations to encourage human rights (Morris, 57). These codes obviously varied from
one company to another and were very difficult to monitor and enforce (Morris, 58).
After it was made clear that they no longer had to improve their human rights conditions
to get favorable trade status, the Chinese only allowed five more visits to prisons, and
during those they restricted access to some prisons and refused inspections of
“reeducation through labor’ facilities that China did not consider prisons (Lampton, 128).
Effectively, Clinton had given up on using economic pressure from the U.S. government
to improve human rights in China.

Why did this happen?

Although the Chinese did not meet all of the requirements set forth by the
administration in 1993, they did meet the two most important, mandatory ones.

This

means that, obviously, the pressure got to them somehow, no matter how much of a show
they put on for American visitors. Again, U.S. policymakers gave up on disciplinary
actions before giving them a chance to work, just as the Bush administration had done in
1989.

Beijing had assumed that American business interests would pressure the

administration to continue MFN status no matter what and prevail, and they were right
(Lampton, 137). After the decision to de-link human rights and MFN, along with
instances where Clinton had “vacillated and retreated in the face of prior foreign policy
challenges during his first term — Somalia, Bosnia, and Haiti,” the American government

lost much of its credibility worldwide on human rights issues (Lampton, 137). Because
of these “vacillations” and an obvious lack of commitment to actually trying to make

human rights pressures work, the Chinese government has made a habit of appeasing
global observers by releasing into exile a few individual political prisoners who are highprofile either before or after summits, but doing nothing to fundamentally change the
overall system of oppression in the country (Lampton, 142). In the face of inconsistent

policy and no force of will behind U.S. declarations, China has not been forced to
significantly change, only to put on a show of human rights improvements from time to
time. But why the lack of commitment on the part of the American government?

Are

there really U.S. interests so vital that the country’s economic or geopolitical status
would be significantly damaged by cutting or restricting economic ties with China?
In the 1990s, China did in fact become much more dependent on trade with the
US., with 38.7 percent of its exports going to America by 1998 (Lampton, 115). As
already mentioned, a significant number of Chinese workers also depended on Americaninvested firms for their jobs, but did this dependence extend to the American side of the
equation as well? China was a significant trading partner by the end of the twentieth
century, and proponents of unconditional MNF argued that U.S. economic strength would
be enhanced by fully engaging China and that a damaging number of American jobs
would be lost by impeding trade liberalization through human rights conditionality
(Morris, 68). Critics of conditionality also pointed to the large American trade deficit
with China as a reason to open up trade (Morris, 79). The deficit argument was
dangerously misleading, however, since it was in large part due to direct foreign
investments in China through U.S. firms, meaning that much of the money China made
from exports was pumped directly back into the American economy (Morris, 79). In
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addition, the theory that “hundreds of thousands” of American jobs would be lost through

implementing human rights conditions was greatly exaggerated by lobbyists and
unconditional MFN advocates, according to most economists.

Economist Jagdish

Bhagwati explains:

“The costs to the U.S. economy were much exaggerated by advocates of
unconditional MFN to China. If MFN to China were to be denied, U.S. retail
prices would have risen only temporarily, until American companies began
manufacturing in other low-wage countries, such as India, Indonesia, Malaysia, or
the untapped African continent”(Morris, 83).
In fact, more U.S. jobs were dependent at the time on exports to Canada, Mexico, Latin
America, Japan, Europe, Hong Kong, and Taiwan than China (Morris, 82). As it turns

out, jobs were not the only consequence of conditionality being “exaggerated” by
opponents of human rights requirements.
As always, businesses will look out for the bottom line and lobby the government
to make sure nothing gets in the way of profits. By the early 1990s, business lobbies
became much more vocal in their support for unconditional MFN, with interests ranging
from the National Retail Federation to the National Association of Wheat Growers
(Morris, 93). Organizations like the United States-China Business Council and the
Business Coalition for U.S.-China Trade were formed, with the Coalition having over

800 corporations and trade associations as members by 1994 (Morris, 94). In a hearing
before a House committee in 1993, Donald Anderson, president of the United States-

China business Council, was caught in a particularly shameless “exaggeration” by
Congressman Tom Lantos during questioning after stating that “withdrawing or
conditioning MFN would mean a loss of $8 billion in U.S. exports” (Morris, 96).
Rep. Lantos: You mean that what you are saying is that withdrawing or
conditioning MFN would mean $8 billion in lost exports...the size of our total
exports [to China]?

Mr. Anderson:

No sir, that is an over-statement.

Rep. Lantos: It is a lie, Mr. Anderson. It has no relationship to reality. You
ought to be ashamed of yourself. You prepared this statement on behalf of the
United States-China Business Council and in the opening paragraph that is not
tangentially related to the truth. As a matter of fact, I predict to you...that despite
the fact there will be a conditioning of MFN to China, there will be an increase in
American exports to China next year and the year after and the following year.
Because China is a growing economy and they desperately need the things it buys
from us. (U.S. Congress, House, 1993 [Lantos], pp. 21-22; [Anderson], p. 21)
Obviously, the American economy probably would have felt a temporary negative impact

had trade with China been impeded by conditionality, but economists largely agreed that
the effect would in fact have been temporary, and much smaller than what business

interests predicted.

So, were there reasons for opposing conditionality other than “over-

statements” of economic consequences and greed?

Some opponents of conditionality did argue that unconditional MFN might
actually improve human rights in China.

These policymakers argued that through

increased contact and economic engagement, American businesses could reach out

directly to the people and help create a middle class that would insist on democratic
social and political values (Morris, 90).

Some argued that this engagement, combined

with the voluntary corporate initiatives proposed by the Clinton administration and
Congress, would be more effective in promoting human rights than conditioning MFN.
The problem with this argument was that history had already proven it wrong — despite
yearly renewal of MFN to China since 1980, the human rights situation had only gotten

worse, particularly after the 1989 Tiananmen incident (Morris, 91). In contrast, the one
year in which conditionality was imposed, 1993, saw significant improvements in

In
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emigration policies and implementation of the prison labor agreement.

While all the

objectives were not met, there was progress made, and all the while trade between the
two countries continued to flourish in spite of the displays of defiance by the Chinese
government.
Overall, U.S. policies toward China over the past two decades have demonstrated
a lack of commitment to human rights because of the possible threat of temporary
negative economic consequences.

Even when faced with the opinions of experts and

economists who advocate conditionality, American policymakers are too afraid of any
economic setback to act in the interests of those who suffer in forced silence in China.
Instead, U.S. policy tends toward ineffectual voluntary codes of conduct and
rationalizations for not using the most powerful tool at its disposal to effect human rights
change in other countries. Rather than endanger any economic growth or supply of
resources, the United States government has continually demonstrated that it will tolerate
human rights abuses by refusing to exert the political will necessary to make oppressive
regimes change their ways. This was evident for trade and economic growth in general in
China, and it has been illustrated elsewhere in instances involving only one particular
resource.
Saudi Arabia

Obviously, Saudi Arabia is a country known for a single resource: oil. Saudi
Arabia possesses 25 percent of the world’s proven petroleum reserves, it is the largest
exporter of petroleum, and it plays a leading role in OPEC.

Petroleum accounts for

roughly 75 percent of budget revenues, 45 percent of GDP, and 90 percent of export
earnings.'® The United States is the biggest partner in the Saudi oil business, ranking as
the second-largest source of foreign oil for the United States.
18
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In 2006, the U.S. imported

roughly 1.4 million barrels of oil per day from Saudi Arabia.'? The American economic
partnership with Saudi Arabia is just as important to the Saudis as it is to the U.S. While
16.8 percent of Saudi exports go to the United States, 14.8 percent of Saudi imports come
from America.'*

Since the economic relationship between the two countries is so strong,

it is no surprise that the U.S. would be fairly lax in pushing the Saudis toward liberal
democratic reforms. What might be surprising is the extent to which American
policymakers have gone to not just tolerate, but in some instances actually support, the
repressive royal regime in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
Saudi Arabia’s government has lagged behind on human rights issues for many
years. The system of government lends itself to oppression and tyranny, as the country is
amonarchy ruled by the Al Saud family, which bases its legitimacy on its own
interpretation of Islamic law (U.S. Dept. of State).

Members of the royal family are not

required to appear before courts, there is no freedom of speech or the press, and all
government employees are banned from criticizing the government (U.S. Dept. of State).

Dissent in any form is not tolerated. In addition to censoring the press and government
employees, the government prohibited the establishment of political parties or any other
group that the government considered to be in opposition to the royal family (U.S. Dept.
of State). In a system designed in such a way, it is nearly impossible to avoid corruption
and oppression, and the Saudi royal family has shown no shortage of either. Basic
human rights and international standards have been ignored continually, and this is not a
recent development.
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For example, slavery was not outlawed in the country until 1962, and even then
the practice flourished until the mid-1970s (Posner, 27). Freedom of religion is a
completely foreign concept within the country.
“The Basic Law states that Islam is the official religion and all citizens are
required to be Muslims...the government limits the practice of all but the
officially sanctioned version of Islam and prohibits the public practice of other
religions...conversion by a Muslim to another religion is widely considered
apostasy, a crime punishable by death if the accused does not recant” (U.S. Dept.
of State).
The only version of Islam sanctioned by the state is an ultra-conservative Sunni
branch known as Wahhabism (Posner, 28). Muslims caught with Shiite prayer books are
subject to arrest and jailing (Posner, 28). Freedom of speech is completely non-existent.
Radio was only allowed in the country after religious authorities became concerned about
the “godless” radio stations picked up from Cairo, and when it was finally permitted, the
only station was Radio Mecca, which was “basically a non-stop recitation of Koranic
verses” (Posner, 29). Western books, magazines, and newspapers are only allowed after
they have been fully censored to delete any offensive material that might break the
religious codes or criticize the government (Posner, 30). One would think that with all
these blanket restrictions on every citizen, there would be little room for discrimination
and repression of one particular group, but the Saudis have managed to keep women even
more oppressed than the rest of the general population.
Women are essentially absent from Saudi public society altogether. They are
banned from performing legal or financial transactions on their own, they make up only
five percent of the workforce, and the few female employees there are can only interact
with a male supervisor or client via phone or fax (Posner, 31). Women are not allowed to
travel abroad without a husband’s permission, daughters can only inherit halfas much as

sons, a woman’s testimony in court is given half the weight of a man’s, and husbands
who take additional wives are not required to tell their earlier wives about the new ones
(Posner, 31). The law even says that women may not be admitted to a hospital for
treatment without a male relative’s permission (U.S. Dept. of State). In public, women
are expected to wear a black garment called an abaya that covers the entire body and to
cover their head and hair; religious police as recently as last year frequently harassed both
citizen and noncitizen women who were not wearing an abaya and hair cover (U.S. Dept.
of State). Freedom of movement for women is even restricted within the country.
Females are not allowed to drive cars or motorcycles or even ride bicycles in public
(Posner, 32). Even riding in cars can be risky; as of 2006, women still faced arrest by the
religious police if they were found “riding in a vehicle driven by a male who was not an
employee or a close male relative” (U.S. Dept. of State). In 1990, 45 women took their
husbands’ cars and drove them into downtown Riyadh to protest this restriction — the
leaders were arrested, tried, and imprisoned.

Some other participants had their passports

confiscated, and all were placed under surveillance by the Saudi security service (Posner,

32). According to Gov. Ray Mabus, former Ambassador to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
from 1994-1996, “Our State Department Human Rights Reports have always given them
low rankings.” If this is the case, then has there been any action on the part of the United
States government to pressure the Saudis in any way to reform?
Sadly, the U.S. government seems to have been unwilling to even attempt to
persuade the Saudi royal family to change its country’s ways, even in the most important
of areas.

“We have not pushed the Saudis hard enough on some things that we tend to push
other people on in terms of human rights, and I think the reason we have not done

that is that the economic and military parts of our relationship have been seen as
so overwhelming that anything that would interfere with those two things has
been given a backseat” (Mabus).
The economic part of the American relationship with the Saudis has been nurtured with
great care by U.S. policymakers since the 1970s.

In that decade, the U.S. set up the Joint

Economic Commission to help the Saudis establish government bureaucracies, and the
Treasury Department established the Office of Saudi Arabian Affairs, the only such
office for any foreign country — all to capitalize on Saudi oil money (Posner, 67). These
are not the only examples of the privileged place the Saudis have held in American policy
despite their atrocious human rights record.

During the 1970s, the Department of

Commerce, at taxpayer expense, held seminars and mailed thousands of invitations to
U.S. business leaders encouraging them to take advantage of “unprecedented” business
opportunities in the Arab world, focused mostly on Saudi Arabia (Posner, 67). In
addition, in 1975, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers had $4 billion in military and
civilian construction projects underway in the Kingdom — all this while the government
was allowing an illicit slave trade to prosper (Posner, 68). While the U.S. Army was in
charge of the construction, they did not have full autonomy in the projects. The Saudis
were the only country to get veto power over any American contractor chosen by the
Corps (Posner, 68). The reason behind this unprecedented power is one of the most
shameful aspects of U.S. foreign policy in the past half-century.
Obviously, as a fundamentalist Arab nation, Saudi Arabia is not a supporter of the
state of Israel or the Jewish people in general.

The Saudis were able to obtain veto power

over any contractor in order to ensure that no firms with Jewish employees were hired
(even if they had no connection to Israel) and to maintain the purity of the Arab boycott

60

of Israeli businesses at the time (Posner, 68). The most disturbing aspect of the American

policy toward Saudi Arabia’s institutionalized discrimination is that it was not only
tolerated, but also that the U.S. actually helped in the screening process. The deputy
director of military construction in the Office of the Chief of Engineers, Colonel William
L. Durham, told a Senate investigating Committee that requests for visas to work in Saudi
Arabia had to be accompanied by proof that the applicant was not Jewish (in the form of
a baptism certificate, marriage license, letter from a church, etc.) on orders from the

Defense Department and the State Department because “the Arabs make the rules”
(Posner, 69). Thankfully, this practice of carrying out anti-Semitic Saudi policies was
ended shortly after, but the Saudi human rights record has not improved in the decades
since, and neither has the American response.

Conservative as the royal family is, there are elements in the Kingdom that wish it
would do even more to restrict public life. The introduction of television actually led to a
storming of the only station by religious zealots in 1965 that had to be put down by the
government (Posner, 30). The Saudi government’s policies on women have not
improved, and after the 1979 takeover of the Grand Mosque in Mecca (the most holy site
in Islam, where millions of Muslims go on pilgrimages every year) by fundamentalists
who condemned the royal family as “corrupt and greedy rulers who consorted with the
infidels,” the Saudis adopted many of the policies of the extremists they had been forced
to defeat, becoming much more conservative on matters of Wahhabism (Posner, 96).

Later, in order to placate conservatives who opposed the presence of American troops
during and after the Gulf War in the early 1990s, the royal family further strengthened
ties with fundamentalists in other areas, like education (Posner, 140).
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Under some pressure from the United
States, the Saudi government in 2002
said
they would launch a review and delete offensive
material from school text, ooks, but

requests for a list of the changes have not been answered
(Posner, 141). As of 2006, the
government still does not permit
the study of evolution, Freud, Marx,
Western music, or

Western philosophy, and some college professors
have had suspicions that informants
were monitoring their classrooms and reporting
back to government and religious

authorities to ensure that all teachings were in accord with the government’s
positions
(U.S. Dept. of State).

Last November, the government again announced
an initiative to

revise textbooks to promote religious tolerance, since its first
effort was obviously a
failure, in light of the fact that “many recently utilized textbooks still contain
language
that was blatantly anti-Semitic and intolerant of Judaism, Christianity, and the Shi’a
tradition” (U.S. Dept. of State).

The Saudis seem uninterested in changing their legacy

of intolerance and isolationism, unless this most recent project turns out to be a drastic
departure from prior policy.
Given the horrendous record of the Saudi government, how have recent U.S.

policymakers dealt with the Kingdom from a human rights standpoint? “It is not high
alwayys
enough on our list of priorities” (Mabus). It seems that human right
i s are, againin,, alwa
ed to
trumped by other concerns. “I think the U.S., historically, with the S audis has tend

deal with them much more on an economic and military basis as being the most

important cornerstones of our relationship, and that human rights tended to take a lesser
place in terms of how it affected our relationship” (Mabus). In addition to the fact that
American policymakers do not want to alienate their second-largest source
of oil, there is
the fact that the Saudis, similar to the Reagan paradigm, have always been seen as

friendly.
While the U.S. is likely to pressure other regimes for change on human rights if
they are seen as hostile or even simply unimportant to U.S. geopolitical and economic
aims, the Saudis receive special treatment.

“We have always viewed Saudi Arabia as an

ally...we have not used any of the muscle that we have to push them harder on some
human rights issues such as the way they treat women, such as moving toward a more
democratically-elected government, and we have done that in other places” (Mabus).

The issue of geopolitical and economic importance probably makes American officials at
least pay more attention to Saudi actions, especially in relation to oil supply. However,
even being less dependent on imported oil might not make U.S. policymakers force the
Saudis’ hand on human rights. “I think that if we were less dependent on them for oil, we
wouldn’t care as much.

We might push more, but our heart wouldn’t be in it” (Mabus).

This sentiment seems to sum up U.S. policy toward human rights in general: Our heart

simply isn’t in it, whether in Saudi Arabia, China, Cambodia, Rwanda, or anywhere else
in the world.

Chapter 5 — Conclusion
The formation and implementation of America’s foreign policy is clearly a
complex process involving various factions, influences, and ideas. However, as the

previous chapters have shown, U.S. policymakers have consistently chosen to promote
America’s short-term interests and goals and have sacrificed the country’s selfproclaimed morals on the altars of personal popularity, geopolitical power strategies, and
economic prosperity.

This consistent policy has obviously been seen as beneficial by

decision makers, since it has prevailed for the better part of a century. However, are
there times when national interest might have been better served by following the moral
compass rather than the public opinion poll or the almighty dollar? Does there have to be
a constant tension between realism and idealism in the new century, or can there be a new
paradigm in foreign policy that recognizes the ultimate responsibility of governments to
take care of their own interests while at the same time preserving a certain basic level of
morality and justice in the world?
After World War II, when the United States was just beginning to realize the
menace it faced in the form of the Soviet Union, there did not seem to be room for

idealistic crusades that might divert valuable resources from the fight against
communism.

In 1945 there was a “very real monster to contain,” and this caused the

demise of U.S. isolationism (Schlesinger, 5). According to George F. Kennan, advisor to
President Truman, ambassador to the Soviet Union in the 1950s, and prominent author,
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during the Cold War there was no time for the government to worry about moral

problems.
“Whoever looks thoughtfully at the present situation of the United States in
particular will have to agree that to assure these blessings [military security,
integrity of political life, and well-being of the people] to the American people is
a task of such dimensions that the government attempting to meet it successfully
will have very little, if any, energy and attention left to devote to other
undertakings, including those suggested by the moral impulses of these or those
of its citizens.”
This philosophy dominated American policy throughout the Cold War. It dictated that
the U.S. use all of its power to fight the Soviet Union in order to preserve its very
existence, and this was the greatest good, so any morally questionable actions taken to

this end were justified.
Kennan goes on to generalize his argument against morality in foreign policy
beyond the Cold War context.

He insists that there is no clear international code of

behavior, so if there are to be moral principles enforced in foreign policy, they must be
America’s own.

Since this would imply an attitude that assumes America’s moral

standards are the same as everyone else’s, which is obviously not the case, then no moral
standards whatsoever can be cited as justification for any action in foreign policy

(Kennan).

Inevitably, this leads to the conclusion that interventions in the affairs of other

countries “can be formally defensible only if the practices against which they are directed
are seriously injurious to our interests, rather than just our sensibilities” (Kennan).

Even

the promotion of democracy is not enough of an interest, since “democracy is a loose
term” and sometimes stability is more important to American interests (Kennan). This
philosophy was certainly acted out to its fullest extent during the Cold War using the
strategy of containment.

U.S. policymakers backed horrendous regimes in the name of

stability and national interest, but did this strategy pay off in the end, and has it paid off
since?
Despite the proclamations of victory over the communism in 1989, it was evident
even by the early 1980s that the Soviet Union was largely responsible for its own demise.
By 1983, the Soviet government was unable to provide its citizens with basic consumer
goods or rely on the honesty of bureaucrats or the loyalty of scientists and writers, and it
faced the challenges of increasing ethnic diversity, a drawn-out war in Afghanistan, and
the rise of a communist rival in China (Schlesinger, 6). So, if American policies were not
solely responsible for the fall of the Soviet Union, what did they accomplish? As has
been discussed, American policies in Cambodia led to U.S. support of a radical
isolationist (not to mention genocidal) government that destabilized the region as a whole

and exposed the hypocrisy of American statements about core values and ideals. Support
for Saddam Hussein in Iraq, the Taliban in Afghanistan, the shah in Iran, and various

Latin American right-wing dictators (Iran-Contra, Pinochet in Chile, etc.) during the Cold
War all proved disastrous.

Granting favorable trade status to China regardless of human

rights violations to counteract Soviet power has led to still more problems with a Chinese
government that now knows it has nothing to fear from feeble U.S. condemnations of
actions that lead to unfair trade practices and continued oppression of the Chinese people.
Support for Saudi Arabia has led to increased dependence on oil from an unstable region
and a very real moral quandary when negotiating with other Middle Eastern nations on
human rights issues and on solutions for the larger problems of the region, such as the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Finally, also in the Middle East, Turkey has proven itself to
be a constant human rights violator and a very inconsistent partner in the war on terror
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and the war in Iraq, despite American politicians continuing to look the other way and
support Turkey’s EU candidacy as its government has taken away its citizens’ basic
freedoms and abused ethnic minorities within its borders.
Perhaps worse than all of these tangible consequences is the intangible damage
that U.S. hypocrisy has done to its own global standing. Foreign governments no longer
trust America to back up its statements, perhaps because the U.S. government has been
unwilling to allow impartial international bodies to hold it accountable for any mistakes it
|
i
|
;
i
i
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might make in the future.

Why would the world’s “beacon of freedom” refuse to sign on

to the Rome Treaty that created the ICC?

Ifthe U.S. has nothing to hide in the areas of

war crimes, genocide, and human rights abuses, why not put itself under the jurisdiction
of the Court?

This is not to accuse the American government of war crimes or human

rights abuses, but immediately shutting down any possibility of an outside investigation
(or even cooperation with investigations of other countries) looks extremely suspicious.
This is not exactly the way to build confidence among allies, and it certainly does not
give those who are already wary of American motives reason to change their minds. It
also could not possibly have helped the U.S.’s credibility when State Department lawyers
helped to draft the Genocide Convention, but Congress refused to ratify it for nearly forty
years. Even when it was ratified, the reservations made by the U.S. only engendered
more suspicion, causing some (even friendly Western democracies) to accuse America of

violating international law.
When the U.S. does try to stand up for what Americans say they believe in places
like China, the tyrannical leaders know they only need to wait out the pressure and the
U.S. will relent. In addition, when the U.S. proposes collective security action on moral
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and national interest grounds, such as the invasion of Iraq in 2003, it is met with
skepticism and little support from the international community as a whole. During the
Cold War, perhaps the U.S. did not have the time or resources to think about these larger

consequences, or perhaps they were acceptable in light of the need for security, as
Kennan suggests. However, since the fall of the Soviet Union, American policymakers
have been left with a debate over what sort of foreign policy to pursue: realist or idealist
(Snow, 15)? “The spate of atrocities in the old Third World...suggests the need for
international reform, the province of a newly energized idealist strain” (Snow, 17).

Interestingly enough, this idealist prioritization of individual and group rights over
sovereignty has flipped the positions of realists and idealists on the use of military force —
now it is the idealists who advocate intervention and the realists who encourage restraint
(Snow, 18). So, which of these competing schools of thought is right? Should the U.S.
only intervene in clear-cut situations of national interest, since there are no universal

moral standards, or should it step in to defend human rights whenever possible?
It seems to me that the answer is somewhere in between these two extremes.
While writers like Kennan and Schlesinger may have been right at the time when they

said there were no universal moral standards and therefore the U.S. had no right to cite
moral concerns as justification for intervening in another state’s affairs, this is rapidly
changing if it has not already done so. There may be no worldwide comprehensive code
of behavior, but there is a growing body of nearly universally accepted norms and
agreements that do, in fact, have enforcement clauses to ensure their effectiveness.

agreements are not just broad statements that are generally agreed upon, but specific
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These

treaties that are signed and ratified after debate in the vast majority of the world’s nations.
For example, of the 192 members of the United Nations:
e

all 192 are parties to the Convention on the Rights of the Child,

e

177 are party to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women,

e

169 are party to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination,

|
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e

152 are party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

e

149 are party to the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights (though the U.S. is not among them),
136 are party to the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment,”’ and

e

133 are party to the Genocide Convention”!

While only one of these agreements is in fact universally accepted, for a nation that
believes in majority rule, the others are certainly strong contenders for legal status. These
are not morally ambiguous agreements; they condemn the most basic of atrocities that
almost all people in all cultures decry, and they provide remedies for them.

Ifthe United

States, as the sole remaining superpower and world hegemon, would simply act to
enforce them, something might be done to at least prevent crimes such as genocide.
One of Schlesinger’s main critiques of ideology as a guiding force in foreign
policy was that it characterizes “every local mess as a test of global will” (7). Perhaps
” Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights report: Status of Ratifications of the
Principal International Human Rights Treaties
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/treaty | gen.htm

what is needed is a little more global will, led by the global superpower.

Collective

security is much less risky for any one nation, and while the U.S. certainly stands to lose
more from intervening, it also stands to gain more.

For example, countries where human

rights violations take place tend to become breeding grounds and safe havens for
terrorists, who then go on to attack American interests. This has been evident in Saudi
Arabia (a majority of the 9/11 hijackers were Saudis) and in Sudan, which harbored alQaeda in the late 1990s, allowing the attack on the USS Cole and American embassies in
Africa. In addition, more stable economic conditions in these areas lead to more trade in

general, and the U.S. always benefits more from increased trade than other countries. As
has already been discussed, the hegemon gets to make the rules of the game, and as long
as the United States continues to proclaim its values and then not follow through on their
implementation, it will continue to be viewed as less than credible on the world stage.
Since in the short run it is only costly for the U.S. to actually take action, and it is safe to
merely make broad statements, this has been the prevailing strategy. However, when the
credibility gap begins to catch up with America (Iraq in 2003), the cost of hypocrisy
becomes clear.
This is not to say that America should intervene militarily in every instance where
one of the aforementioned agreements is violated, but there will be little risk of
overreactions if the other member states of the United Nations are consulted before action
is taken. To be sure, this will take some effort and reform on the part of the U.N. as well
as the U.S. America does not bear sole responsibility for the actions of the rest of the
world. However, carefully measured collective action can ensure that appropriate
measures are taken to enforce only the most widely agreed-upon human rights
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declarations, but this action requires leadership.

Leadership can only come from the

world’s leader, and as the U.S. is so fond of reminding everyone, it occupies that
position. Rarely, military intervention may be necessary (for example, to stop to a
genocide), but certainly not in every case, and hopefully not only from the U.S. Working
together, the nations surrounding trouble spots and the most powerful countries in the
world can come up with the incentives to stop the most serious human rights violations.
This need not always entail military intervention. For example, U.S.
conditionality for MFN

status, while not a cure-all, was effective for the two mandatory

conditions that were imposed.

However, because of the Chinese government’s

belligerent rhetoric, American policymakers backed off and have been unable to make
headway on human rights issues since cutting ties between human rights and trade status.
If this strategy was effective bilaterally, then surely collective U.N. action would be even
more persuasive, without putting a single soldier from a single country in harm’s way.
Aside from pressuring human rights violators that have already abused their power, it is
possible to take preventive measures as well, especially for such serious incidents as
genocide. By using common indicators that are already tracked, such as the number of
refugees from a given country, radio and television broadcasts encouraging ethnic
discrimination and stereotyping (such as what happened prior to the Rwandan genocide),
and other signals, possible genocides can be identified and hopefully prevented
(Jonassohn and Bjornson, 96). The cooperation of NGOs, media outlets, and various
international bodies can be extremely helpful in this process (Jonassohn and Bjornson,
101). Finally, if military intervention is necessary, when world leaders (including the
United States and others) step up to fulfill their obligations under international

agreements, other countries will be much more like]

Y to follow. As he
.

Semon theory

dictates, the superpower gets to make
the rules of the game, and even if the only

punishment for breaking those rules
is shame, Sometimes the desire to
save face can be a
powerful motivator in the global community. In
this way, America can lead the fight
against tyranny without having
to bear the burden alone, and
also without claiming to be
the “happy empire of perfect wisdo
m and perfect virtue, commissioned
to save all

mankind” that Schlesinger so cynically descri
bed.

With collective action, the U.S. will

merely be leading a global consensus, not acting
as a holier-than-thou global police force.

Only when the U.S. commits to back up its rhetor
ic can it truly declare itself to be
the world’s leader. There is a middle ground between a foreig
n policy driven solely by
ideology and one that only takes into account the harsh realiti
es of national interest.
Sometimes, the two even overlap.

By helping to stop heinous human rights violations

with the help of international partners, the United States can gain credibility and also
help
itself by getting rid of oppressive regimes that are likely to support terrorism, hamper
trade and travel, and cause more problems down the road for America and the rest of the
world.

In this way, a dose of morality in foreign policy can actually serve the national

interest while making the world a better place and satisfying the consciences of ordinary
Americans.
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